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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Ross argued in his Appellant's Brief that the district court erred in finding he violated
his probation by committing the crimes of petit theft and injury to child. The State argues in its
Respondent's Brief that the district court did not err in finding Mr. Ross committed these crimes.
Mr. Ross submits this Reply Briefto respond to the State's argument. Notably, the State does not
contest Mr. Ross' s assertion that this case should be remanded to the district court for a new
disposition hearing if this Court agrees there was error with respect to either of the alleged
violations.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Ross included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his Appellant's Brief,
which he relies on and incorporates herein. (See Appellant's Br., pp.1-2.)

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err in finding Mr. Ross violated his probation by committing the crimes of
petit theft and injury to child?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Finding Mr. Ross Violated His Probation By Committing The
Crimes Of Petit Theft And Injury To Child

A.

Introduction
Mr. Ross argued in his Appellant's Brief that the district court erred in fmding he violated

his probation by committing the crime of petit theft because he was found not guilty of this
crime. (Appellant's Br., pp.5-7.) The State recognizes on appeal that neither the Idaho Supreme
Court nor the Court of Appeals has addressed the question of whether a court can revoke
probation based on an allegation that a probationer has committed a crime for which he has been
acquitted. (Respondent's Br., p.11.) The State argues the judgement of acquittal is irrelevant, but
that argument is unpersuasive.
Mr. Ross argued the district court erred in fmding he violated his probation by
committing the crime of injury to child because the State did not present any evidence that he
acted willfully in causing or permitting his children to be placed in a dangerous situation, which
is a necessary element of the offense. (Appellant's Br., pp.7-10.) The State contends there was
sufficient evidence of willfulness based on testimony that Mr. Ross "was aware of the risk that
his children could get out of the house by themselves if they were left unattended."
(Respondent's Br., p.16.) The State's argument misses the mark. The fact that Mr. Ross was
aware of the risk does not mean he acted willfully within the meaning of the statute.
Mr. Ross argued in his Appellant's Brief that if this Court concludes the district court
erred in fmding he violated his probation with respect to either allegation, then the case should
be remanded to the district court for a new disposition hearing. (Appellant's Br., pp.10-11.) The
State does not address this argument on appeal, thereby conceding remand is necessary if this
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Court concludes the district court erred in finding Mr. Ross violated his probation by committing
the crime of petit theft or by committing the crime of injury to child. 1 See, e.g., State v. Almaraz,
154 Idaho 584, 598-99, 601 (2013) (holding the State waived harmless error argument by failing
to discuss it in its written brief on appeal and "only vaguely [referencing in] at oral argument").

B.

This Court Should Hold That A Court Cannot Revoke Probation Based On An Allegation
That A Probationer Has Committed A Crime For Which He Has Been Acquitted
The State recognizes the question presented in this case is a matter of first impression,

and argues this Court should conclude a court can revoke probation notwithstanding a judgment
of acquittal for two reasons. First, the State argues it does not have to prevail in a criminal trial in
order to prevail on a probation violation, so its failure to prevail in a criminal trial should not
prevent it from prevailing on a probation violation. (See Respondent's Br., p.11.) Second, the
State argues a judgment of acquittal is not relevant in a probation proceeding because there are
different burdens of proof in criminal trials and probation proceedings, and the Idaho Rules of
Evidence apply in criminal trials, but not in probation proceedings. (Respondent's Br., p.12.)
Both of these arguments are unpersuasive.
The State is correct that a judgment of conviction is not a prerequisite to a probation
violation, even when the alleged violation is the commission of a crime. See State v. Day, 154
Idaho 649, 651 n.1 (Ct. App. 2013). However, where the State cannot obtain a conviction
because of insufficient evidence (as opposed to a procedural irregularity), a judgment of acquittal
may indeed be relevant, and should perhaps preclude a probation violation under a collateral
estoppel theory. See id.; see also Woods v. State, 526 P.2d 944, 947 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974)
(distinguishing between a factual judgment of acquittal, which may have preclusive effect, but is
1

If this Court concludes the district court erred with respect to both allegations, then it should
remand this case to the district court with instructions to place Mr. Ross back on probation.
4

beyond the scope of the instant case, and a judgment of acquittal resulting from a procedural
defect), abrogated on other grounds by Wortham v. State, 188 P.3d 201 (Okla. Crim. App.
2008). Even if this Court determines a judgment of acquittal does not automatically preclude a
probation violation under an estoppel theory, it is surely relevant where, as here, it results from a
jury's factual finding. In this case, the district court did not even refer to the judgment of
acquittal in evaluating the State's evidence. (See Tr., p.112, L.11 -p.113, L.15.)
While there are different standards of proof, and different evidentiary rules, at probation
proceedings as compared to criminal trials, the questions presented in probation proceedings and
criminal trials are not entirely different, as the State contends. (See Respondent's Br., p.12
(stating "a jury is asked to answer a different question at a criminal trial than the district court is
asked to answer at a probation revocation hearing"). The question in both instances is whether
the individual violated the law. Here, the district court erred in concluding Mr. Ross violated the
law prohibiting petit theft when it failed to even consider the fact that the jury acquitted him of
this crime.

C.

The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence That Mr. Ross Committed The Crime Of
Injury To Child Because It Did Not Present Any Evidence That He Acted Willfully
Within The Meaning Of The Statute
In order to be found guilty of injury to child, a defendant must "willfully cause[ ] or

permit[] [a] child to be placed in [a] situation that [endangers the child]." LC. § 18-1501(1). The
word "willfully" means "acting or failing to act where a reasonable person would know the act or
failure to act is likely to result in injury or harm or is likely to endanger the ... child." LC. § 181501 (5); ICJI 1243. Mr. Ross argued in his Appellant's Brief that the State did not present any
evidence that he acted willfully when, unbeknownst to him, his children were not supervised by
his wife or the other adult in his home, left the house through the back door, and ran across the

5

street. (Appellant's Br., pp.7-10.) The State asserts Mr. Ross "overlooks Aragon's testimony."
(Respondent's Br., p.10.) The State is incorrect.
Shadra Aragon, a child protection worker, testified she visited Mr. Ross and his wife on
November 13 regarding a report that their children had been unsupervised five days earlier.
(Tr., p.15, Ls.1-2, p.17, Ls.12-15.) She said, "I seen the kiddos, and then we talked a little bit
about what happened, and they said that it was an accident, that the girls had gotten out of the
back door, the sliding glass door, and that it wouldn't happen again .... " (Tr., p.17, L.17 - p.18,
L.2.) On cross-examination, she said, "I don't believe they [the parents] intended for them to
leave on either occasion." (Tr., p.15, Ls.3-4) Ms. Aragon' s testimony is not sufficient evidence
to establish, under any standard, that Mr. Ross acted willfully when his children left the house
without permission, and walked across the street.
The State argues "Ross willfully permitted his children to be placed in what he knew was
a dangerous situation when he ... allowed the girls to be left unattended while he slept, with the
ability to get out of the house and into the busy street, unaccompanied and undressed, on a cold
day." (Respondent's Br., p.16.) Under the State's reasoning, Mr. Ross would be guilty of injury
to child if, at any point after Ms. Aragon's visit, he slept in his house while his children were also
at home-regardless of whether those children were supposed to have been supervised by
another adult in the home at the time. Surely sleeping in one's own home is not the type of
conduct the Legislature intended to criminalize as injury to child.
The district court rejected Mr. Ross's argument that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence of willfulness because Mr. Ross "assumed a special duty of care and responsibility" for
his children. (Tr., p.110, Ls.18-25.) As Mr. Ross argued in his Appellant's Brief, the fact that he
had a special duty of care for his children does not negate the willfulness element of the statute,
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and does not mean that he himself has to actively supervise his children at all times. (See
Appellant's Br., pp.7-10.) The district court erred in finding Mr. Ross committed injury to child,
and erred in concluding he violated his probation.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ross
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order revoking his probation and
executing his sentence, and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 1st day of December, 2020.

I sf Andrea W. Reyno Ids
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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